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ABSTRACT
Protecting natural areas is a vital component of environmental policy,
both to maintain dwindling biological diversity and to protect the natural
productivity of land and water resources. Since the early 1980s, conservation
experts have agreed that parks and reserves are more likely to meet their
objectives if they can benefit local people. Integrating conservation and social
concerns has, however, proved extremely difficult; successful examples are rare,
particularly in developing countries.
In 1989 the state government of Ceard, one of the poorest states in Brazil,
created a 446 hectare biological reserve to protect a mangrove swamp in the
center of the state's capital city, Fortaleza. Simultaneously, it provided funds and
technical assistance to upgrade the houses of some 10,000 squatters living on the
edge of the park, contrary to the more usual practice of removing or relocating
squatters. The squatters now help the authorities protect the area by preventing
further land invasions near their communities.
This study analyses why a poor state in a developing country invested its
own funds to conserve a mangrove swamp, and how it simultaneously managed
to integrate the needs of local people. Particular political and financial
opportunities gave the state incentives to create the park, while the layout of the
land in question forced the authorities to reconcile this plan with squatters'
housing needs. Once the state integrated conservation with housing, previously
conflicting interest groups found that their campaigns were mutually enforcing.
The project became politically feasible because it combined a multitude of
interests and opportunities. Its success has subsequently helped other
environmental initiatives in Ceard. The case indicates that although policy-
makers cannot predict opportunities, they can manage and sometimes create the
fortuitous circumstances that lead to successful projects.
The Parque Ecol6gico do Coc6 protects a small area of mangrove, yet its
principal interest does not come from its fauna and flora. It stands in the center
of Brazil's fifth largest city as an example of the benefits of conservation and a
small, but rare, instance where conservation was reconciled with the needs of
local people.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Tendler
Professor of Political Economy
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AUMEF Autarchy of the Metropolitan Area of Fortaleza, responsible for
land use and urban planning issues. In 1991 AUMEF's name
changed to SEDURB
(Autarquia da Regido Metropolitana de Fortaleza)
BNB Bank of the Northeast of Brazil
(Banco do Nordeste do Brasil)
BNH National Housing Bank
(Banco Nacional da Habitaqdo)
CAGECE Water and Sewage Company of the State of Ceard
(Companhia de Agua e Esgoto do Estado do Ceara)
CEF Federal Savings Bank
(Caixa Econ6mica Federal)
COHAB State Housing Company
(Companhia Estadual de Habitaqdo)
IDB Inter American Development Bank
(Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento)
SCHP Community Society for Popular Housing
(Sociedade Communitria de Habitagio Popular)
SDU State Department of Urban Development and the Environment
(Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Meio Ambiente).
CAGECE, COHAB, SEDURB, and SEMACE report to SDU.
SEDURB State Superintendency for Urban Development. Before 1991 this
agency was called AUMEF
(Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento Urbano do Estado do
Ceara)
SEHAC Special Department for Housing and Community Programs
(Secretaria Especial de Agio Communitaria)
SEMACE State Superintendency for the Environment
(Superintendencia Estadual do Meio Ambiente)
SFH Housing Finance System
(Sistema Financeira da Habitagio)
SOCEMA Ceara Society for the Environment
(Sociedade Cearense de Defesa do Meio Ambiente e Cultura)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis tells the story of a park established in 1989 in the city of Fortaleza,
Northeast Brazil. The Parque Ecologico do Coc6 covers 446 hectares (1,100 acres)
of mangrove swamp, making it the largest urban park in Latin America, three
times the size of Hyde Park in London (364 acres), and 30% larger than New
York's Central Park (840 acres). The park, however, is significant for more than
just its size.
First, governments in developing countries do not often put
environmental issues high on their priority lists, and very rarely invest their own
funds to conserve ecosystems. In the Coc6 case, a poor region of a developing
country created an ecological park in the center of its capital city entirely as a
local initiative; outsiders were not involved technically or financially. Second,
although parks in urban areas are often created at the expense of the poor, by
removing squatters and razing their settlements, the Parque do Coc6 managed to
incorporate the needs of low-income communities. The poor typically
undermine protected areas by taking resources and/or invading the land, and
public authorities then deal with these squatter intrusions by increasing
monitoring Since the early 1980s, park planners and professionals have agreed
that this is an expensive and often ineffective response, and that they must
design protected areas to compensate local people for loss of access to the land,
and preferably also to give local people incentives to conserve the areas (IUCN
1980, McNeely 1988, McNeely and Miller 1984, Wells and Brandon 1992). Very
few parks, however, have managed this successfully. In contrast to most
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experiences, however, when state agencies created the Parque do Coc6, they also
provided housing and services to some 10,000 squatters that had been living in
shantytowns on the edge of the mangrove, nearly 2% of the city's squatter
population.1
The Parque do Coc6 covers 1.3% of the municipality's 33,600 ha total area,
just outside the city center in one of the most desirable residential areas. Some
90% of the park is mangrove swamp, whose lush foliage and meandering
waterways provide pleasant views for those living nearby and for people
traveling through the city. The recreational area of the park hosts free popular
music concerts and political rallies. In short, the park has become an integral
part of the city as well as protecting an important part of its ecosystem. The
principal agency involved in planning and implementing the park was the state
urban planning agency, SEDURB, 2 which spent 22% of its total project budget
installing the park between 1987 and 1991 (AUMEF 1991).3 This was almost
twice the cost of its next largest project. This paper examines what motivated a
poor area of a developing country to invest such large amounts of its own funds
to protect an ecosystem.
Much of the literature on conservation projects suggests certain factors,
such as committed leadership, environmental education and integrated planning
to reconcile conservation with development, are prerequisites for, or contribute
to successful projects (Kiss 1990, McNeely and Miller 1984:xi, Verwey 1989, Wells
and Brandon 1992). The Parque do Coc6, however, did not rely on those factors.
1 The state government funded the construction of some 2,200 self-built houses for an estimated
10,000 people as part of this initiative. Fortaleza's squatter population in 1991 was 541,000 (SAS
1991). The shanty towns upgraded as part of this project are Aerolandia, Conjunto Tasso
Jereissati and Conjunto Tancredo Neves all on the banks of the Lagba do Coc6.
2 SEDURB was called AUMEF before 1991. To avoid confusion, I use SEDURB throughout this
paper.
The SEDURB documents give a figure of US$ 3.1 million, which is impossibly high, given that it
does not include the land costs. Throughout this paper, I inflate all prices to June 1992 and
convert to US$ at a rate of US$1: Cr3,100.
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First, when the governor signed the decree4 to create the park, he was
responding to series of pressures and opportunities, rather than acting out of
commitment to sustainable development. Some of the political and
administrative leaders of the projects may have been extraordinary individuals,
but they did not need to be for this project to succeed. Second, of all the actors
involved in the project, only technicians had any environmental education. In
fact, now the park is successfully completed, it forms part of the state's
environmental education program. Third, the goals of integrating environment
and development were not set a priori, but emerged during the course of the
project. In this case, bringing together powerful interest groups and being
prepared to respond to sudden opportunities were both more important than the
general prerequisites cited in the literature.
The project is complex, and managed to neutralize opposition and
eventually get support from many different interest groups, including
environmental campaigners, powerful landowners, low income communities
and state government officials. Many factors in this case were inadvertent and
contingent upon a chain of specific local circumstances, but they need not have
been. The Parque do Coc6 yields general lessons for many types of initiative, not
only conservation projects. Managers may not be able to predict or reproduce
particular circumstances, but they can manage opportunities that arise, be
prepared to take advantage of them and, at times, create them.
1.1 Methodology and Organization of Study
The study is based on three months of research in Fortaleza, capital of the State of
Ceara, Northeast Brazil, between June and September 1992, and is one of a group
4 Decree 20.235 of 5 September 1989.
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of seven research projects looking at successful policies and projects in the state
of Ceard. I use material from a total of 57 interviews and 12 site visits, detailed in
Annex 3. I interviewed politicians, public officials, leaders and members of
neighborhood associations, and environmental campaigners. I also interviewed
two people who had opposed the park. Conducting the analysis, I referred to
local newspapers, official documents and academic studies that relate to the park
area. I also reviewed literature on park planning, low-income housing and
service provision, and institutional design.
The study is organized into six chapters. This first chapter introduces and
outlines the case. The middle four chapters then examine the reasons that this
case was successful, and the effects it has had on other parts of the city. Chapter
2 discusses the environmental aspects of the project, and Chapter 3 discusses
how it was easier for the state to create its first ecological park in an urban rather
than rural location. In Chapter 4, 1 discuss the movement for popular housing,
and how SEDURB managed to integrate conservation with the needs of low-
income communities. In order to take advantage of the political opportunities,
the state had to implement the project rapidly and efficiently, and so the fifth
chapter discusses how the different agencies administrated the project. The sixth
and final chapter outlines my conclusions from the case.
1.2 Background to the Case Study
Fortaleza, a city of almost two million inhabitants, is the capital of the state of
Ceari. Situated on the Northeast coast of Brazil, the metropolitan region is home
to some 30% of the state's population of six million. Ceard is one of the poorest
states in Brazil, and, in the country with one of the most unequal income
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distributions in the world,5 Ceard is one of the most unequal states.6 In 1991, per
capita GDP in Ceard was only 42% of the national average (IPLANCE 1992) and
47% of Ceard's urban population earned no more than one minimum salary,
around US$70 per month (Forum 1992).7
Urban poverty is acute. The urban population has grown faster than the
population as a whole, while the population living in shanty towns has grown
even faster. Between 1985 and 1990 the total population of Ceard grew by 10%
while the total urban population increased by 16%,8 but between 1985 and 1991,
the favela population went from 352,000 to 540,000, an increase of 54%. This
means that 31% of Fortaleza's population lives infavelas. 9 (IPLANCE 1992, SAS
1991). In 1991, 29% of the population of the metropolitan region of Fortaleza was
without piped water, and 82% did not have adequate sanitation (CAGECE 1992).
The coverage for water and sewerage services is worse in Ceard than in Brazil as
a whole, and even than in the Northeast as a whole, as Table 1 shows.
5 The top 10% of households receive 46.2% of the country's total household income, while the
bottom 20% receive 2.4% (WDR 1992:277). Both of these figures are the most extreme for all of
the countries listed in the World Development Report. For comparison, in the USA in 1990, the
top 20% of households received 44.3% of the income, and the bottom 20% received 4.6% (US
Department of Commerce 1992).
6 The 1989 Gini coefficient was 0.68 for Ceard, compared to 0.64 for Brazil as a whole and 0.65 for
the Northeast (IPLANCE 1992 and IBGE 1991). A Gini coefficient of 1 indicates perfect inequality
(i.e. with one person having all the wealth and the rest having none). A measure of 0 indicates
perfect equality (i.e. where all persons have an equal share of the wealth). The 1990 Gini
coefficient for the USA is 0.43 (US Department of Commerce 1992).
7 The minimum salary is officially US$ 100 per month, yet it never reaches this amount because
monthly inflation of over 20% devalues it, and it is adjusted more slowly than inflation.
8 The 1980 census projected the state's urban population in 1985 to be 3.5 million and preliminary
data from the 1990 census gives a 1990 figure of 4.1 million. This reflects patterns nationwide.
Over that period, the population of Brazil increased by 11% and the urban population by 15%
(IBGE 1991).
9 Favela is a Brazilian term used interchangeably with shanty towns, defined as "an agglomeration
of precarious, particularly irregular housing, in comparison to other housing in the area,
occupying land owned by third parties for the most part, lacking infrastructure and with 25 or
more houses." (SAS 1991, my translation).
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Table 1
Urban Population Without Water and Sanitation Services, December
1988
Brazil Northeast Cear&
Brazil
Population Without Water 19% 31% 53%
Population Without Sanitation 64% 88% 92%
Source: ABES 1989
Over the period covered by this study (1969-1990), both Brazil and Ceard
experienced marked political changes. A military dictatorship took power in
1964. This regime suspended freedom of assembly and controlled political
opposition, and in Ceard a small elite of large rural landowners, known as
Coroniis had dominated state politics. In the 1980s, authoritarianism gradually
declined, culminating in a return to civilian rule in 1985. In the 1986
gubernatorial elections, Ceard marked an important change away from the
Coroneis by electing a wealthy, 36 year old, urban businessman. When Tasso
Jereissati took office, state finances were in total disarray. Total tax revenues
covered only 70% of the cost of the wages of state employees (The Economist 7-13
December 1991). The new governor emphasized collecting state taxes and
cleaning up government payrolls, reforms that bore fruit two years later, when
the state had repaid the debt, and balanced its budget. The improved financial
position made it possible to finance the projects described in this study.
The River Coc6 runs a 45 km (28 mile) course SW-NE from its source in
the Aratanha mountains, to its mouth on Fortaleza's principal beach (see Map 2).
The river basin drains an area of 517 km2, in the municipalities of Fortaleza,
Aquiriz and Pacatuba (SEMACE 1990b). Water quality is low, principally
because of organic contamination from residential areas discharging sewage
untreated into the river. The city's uncontrolled landfill site at Jangurusdi also
leaches some toxics into the river (Leitio 1992). It is the only river that runs
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through the center of the city of Fortaleza, although the Rio Cear& runs along the
municipality's Northwestern border.
The Parque do Coc6 was worth protecting because it is a mangrove
swamp, tropical ecosystems that have risen to prominence over the past two
decades. They arise in coastal areas on relatively sheltered, muddy, low-lying
terrain, principally in areas of variable water salinity, and are associated with
particular plant and animal species (SEMACE 1990a:15, IUCN 1983). Mangroves
play an important role along shorelines, preventing erosion, recycling and
exporting organic nutrients, and as a habitat for birds, mammals, reptiles and
insects. Their most important role is as a nursery ground for fish and shellfish
(IUCN 1983). Studies in other mangroves indicate that 60-85% of commercially
important fish species depend on mangroves at some stage in their life cycle
(Hamilton and Snedaker 1984:25). Scientists have identified 25 fish species in the
River Coco (Leitio 1992:12), but fishing from the River Coc6 is limited to low-
income individuals taking crabs and fish for subsistence and some resale; high
levels of pollution have precluded more intense exploitation.
Some 60 species of trees and shrubs grow exclusively in mangrove
habitats around the world, but mangrove trees can be divided into six principal
types, three of which, are found in the Parque do Coc6, Rhizophora mangle (red
mangrove), Avicennia shaueriana and Avicennia germinans (black mangrove) and
Laguncularia racemosa (white mangrove) (IUCN 1983, Maragos et al. 1983,
SEMACE 1992). Mangroves occur around estuaries all along the Brazilian coast,
and have been threatened throughout their range. Some Brazilian states have
attempted to conserve mangroves to protect the offshore fishing industry; S~o
Paulo and Parand states, for example, established a coastal zone management
plan to protect mangroves for the benefit of local people (McNeely 1988: 157), but
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Fortaleza is unusual in having preserved the mangrove ecosystems within the
city boundaries.
Despite the area's biological importance, the state only protected it
because a combination of political and economic circumstances made creating an
ecological park both attractive and possible. The pressures and opportunities for
environmental protection are the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 2
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
The Coc6 park did not depend on the factors often cited in the literature as
prerequisites for successful projects. It was contingent on a complex combination
of local circumstances, rather than depending on general factors that could run
across many projects. I do not wish to deny the importance of factors such as
environmental education and integrated planning, but rather to point out that
this project succeeded without them. 10 This chapter discusses the combination of
pressures and opportunities that made the politicians want to create the park,
and then discusses how the initiative fits with other environmental policies in
Ceari.
2.1 Pressures and Opportunities
A long campaign by environmentalists in Fortaleza had a major influence on the
park project. The main initiators of the movement to protect the mangrove came
from the city's intellectual elite.11 Prof. FlAvio Torres de Aradjo founded the
Ceari Society for Environmental Protection (SOCEMA) in 1976, when he
returned from studying for his doctorate in physics at Oxford. During his time in
the UK, he had witnessed the growing power of environmental protest
movements and decided to start a similar non-governmental organization (NGO)
10 Hirschman (1958) has argued that waiting for the prerequisites for successful projects is like
waiting for development itself. He points out that projects can create the conditions for their own
success.
1 Typically, movements to protect species, ecosystems or areas of beauty are led by members of
local elites (Morell and Poznanski 1985, Paehlke 1989). Low income groups generally mobilize
for environmental protection when problems threaten their health or livelihoods (Jain 1991,
Leonard 1985, Lemos 1991).
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when he returned to Ceari. The group had four principal campaigns: to prevent
the use of a toxic herbicide, to protect the coconut trees on the city beach front, to
stop ships discharging bilge water close to shore and a fight to protect a small
area of mangrove on the banks of the River Coc6, which was to represent the
height of the organization's powers.
SOCEMA began the campaign to protect the Coc6 mangroves in 1977. It
fought only for this small site to be turned into a leisure park, but the campaign
marks the first chapter in the 15-year story of citizen movements to preserve the
mangrove swamp and clean up the river. The leisure park created as a result of
this struggle is known as the Parque Adail Barreto, and now forms part of the
446 ha Coc6 ecological park.
SOCEMA began their 1977 campaign when the Bank of the Northeast of
Brazil (BNB), a federally-funded development bank based in Fortaleza, proposed
building a new headquarters building on the margins of the Rio Coco. The
municipal government owned the land and had designated it for the city's first
park in 1969, but lack of funds at that time had forced them to abandon the plans
(0 Povo 10 March 1978). The mayor in 1977, Evandro Ayres, approved of the
BNB plan, and changed the zoning restrictions to allow construction. These
negotiations were reported widely in the local press.
The environmental activists decided to campaign against this plan and to
force the municipal government to convert the land into a leisure park. They saw
the mangroves along the river Coc6 as the last area of green space close to the
city center. The BNB building would remove only a small part of that area, but it
was one of many incremental threats to the land, and it had a high public profile.
SOCEMA therefore campaigned for ten months, at first chiefly by writing articles
for local newspapers and giving talks at conferences. Any expenditure (for
example for street handouts, posters and advertising space) came from members'
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own pockets. The organizers focused the campaign on one major public
demonstration, an "eco-picnic" they held on the banks of the River Coc6 in April
1978. Some 2,000 people came to this event, and it was the largest-scale protest
Ceard had ever seen for an environmental cause.
SOCEMA turned out to be David to the BNB's Goliath, as this small group
of environmentalists managed to fight off the large and powerful institution.
Only eleven days after the picnic, the president of the BNB wrote to the mayor
calling off the deal, citing administrative delays (0 Povo 13 April 1978), although
he now agrees that the protest caused his change of plans.12 Between the
beginning of the campaign and the eco-picnic, Fortaleza had elected a new
mayor, Luis Mdrques, who changed the zoning regulations for the site so that it
was protected. Mdrques was succeeded a few months later by Ldlcio Alcantara,
who aligned himself more with the SOCEMA activists. He directed the
municipal urban planning agency to begin converting the site into a leisure park
less than a year after the BNB had withdrawn.
Why was an environmental pressure group in one of the poorest states in
a developing country able to organize such a successful demonstration? How
was this possible at a time when the first wave of enthusiasm for environmental
issues coming from the 1972 Stockholm conference was waning globally, and the
second, more recent wave had not yet started?
Today, many of the organizers attribute at least part of the power of the
protest to the overall political climate at the time. As noted earlier, a military
government ruled Brazil in 1976, and large-scale civil protest was illegal. The
active members of SOCEMA came from the political left, people with experience
tapping into people's dissatisfaction with their political leaders. Four of the five
12 Personal interview, 21 July 1992.
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founder members of the society had been involved in the student movement in
the 1960s; one had represented Amnesty International in Ceara, and was active in
the feminist movement. Three of those four were professors at the Federal
University (from the departments of physics, geography and biology), which lent
them technical gravitas in different fields. The fifth member was a practising
architect, with connections among other architects and engineers.
In 1977, most public demonstrations were illegal, but the authorities
allowed the eco-picnic because it was not explicitly political. Many of the people
who came to the picnic, however, did so more for political reasons than for
concern over the mangroves. This event was a rare opportunity to protest. What
is more, it was a protest against a public institution. Most people did not resent
the BNB itself, but saw it as a representative of the political regime they hated.
As Torres put it, "SOCEMA was the first escape valve allowing people to say no
to the BNB and to the authorities." In some ways, therefore, this early protest
was not solely concerned with environmental issues. It owed a good part of its
success to people's long-running dislike of the authoritarian government piggy-
backing onto an environmental cause.
This initial success gave the city a small open space, but did not protect
the rest of the river's ecosystem. SOCEMA continued to protest against specific
threats to the mangrove. One campaign was against a company owned by Tasso
Jereissati, who was to become state governor in 1986 and to sign decrees creating
the Parque do Coc6 in 1989. His company proposed a shopping mall in the late
1970s. SOCEMA's protests failed, and the company built a shopping center,
Iguatemi, on the site in 1982. SOCEMA, however, feels that the struggle ensured
that the governor knew about the strength and duration of public concern about
the Coc6 mangroves.
Pressures and Opportunities
The second major wave of campaigning for the park coincided with the
overall political liberalization that swept the country in the mid 1980s. A group
called SOS Coco formed, consisting of SOCEMA and other members of
prominent, well-respected professional organizations. These included the state
branches of the Brazilian Institute of Geographers, the Association of
Agricultural Engineers, the Brazilian Institute of Architects, the Professional
Biologists' Association. The group also included less mainstream organizations,
such as the state branch of the Green Party. SOS Coc6 had broader objectives
than SOCEMA had had in the earlier campaign against the BNB. Whereas in the
late 1970s the environmentalists wanted to create an open space in the city, now
campaigners focused both on protecting the mangrove ecosystem and on
cleaning up the river. From this point onwards, a series of aldermen (vereadores)
and state deputies put proposals to protect the area before the city and state
Legislative Assemblies, which passed nothing until 1986, when the municipality
declared the whole area below the 3m water line13 an environmental protection
area. 14 This action was largely symbolic, as the area was already protected under
the state's water laws, and the municipality's motives for this initiative are
unclear. Lack of enforcement, however, meant that protection under neither the
state water laws nor the municipal environmental area sufficiently protected the
vegetation from periodic threats by developers and squatters, who continued to
cut the mangrove and build on the land.
In summary, therefore, 15 years of constant pressure from various groups
in civil society pushed both the city and the state government into realizing that
sooner or later one or other of them would have to expropriate the land and
establish a park in order to protect the area and mollify public opinion.
13 This is the line 3m above sea level on the banks of the River Coc6 which corresponds to the
environmental protection zone designed to protect the water resources.
14 Municipal Decree 7302, of 23 January 1986.
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In addition to public pressure, at least four other factors contributed to
state politicians perceiving the advantages of establishing the park. First, a
sudden opportunity arose that allowed the state to expropriate the land cheaply.
As described in the following chapter, the state urban planning agency
(SEDURB) struck bargains with two landowners who then donated the land to be
protected, in return for permission to develop other parts of their land. SEDURB
also overcame one landowner's opposition to the park by taking advantage of a
debt he owed to the state.
Second, by the late 1980s, the state government began to see the political
benefits of a good environmental record. At that time, it knew Brazil would be
hosting the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
and the governor of Ceard realized that this would bring increased media
attention to environmental initiatives in Brazil. The state government would be
able to use the Rio '92 conference to show its new green credentials. When the
conference did actually take place, the park was already in existence, and the
government of Ceard extracted its full publicity benefits. It erected a display and
took full page adverts in national magazines showing the Parque do Coc6 ("the
largest urban park in Latin America") as the showpiece of its environmental
efforts.
Third, once the state had decided to build the park and clean up the river,
it became clear that this could help give the state institutional credibility with
international donors. Since 1987, Ceara had been involved in negotiations for a
major loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for sewage
treatment infrastructure. Most of the international aid agencies hesitated before
lending to states in Brazil, feeling that local institutional capacity and financial
controls were too weak. Cear& could show the IDB and other potential donors
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that its institutions were capable of implementing serious environmental
programs by cleaning up the river and preserving the mangrove.
Fourth, some environmentalists say that the governor, Tasso Jereissati,
favored the project because it would benefit one of his investments. As
mentioned above, his company had constructed Iguatemf, the city's only large
shopping center, by cutting an area of mangrove in the early 1980s. By 1989 this
business was thriving; creating the park would simultaneously preserve the
scenic area around the shopping center, and prevent anyone else from setting up
competing businesses nearby. Whether or not this last motivation was
important, public pressure and the other three opportunities alone were
powerful enough to make the project an attractive proposition.
This section, in sum, shows the factors that contributed to the politicians
wanting to create the Coc6 park. In the following section, I show the park's
connection to other environmental policies.
2.2 Links with Broader Environmental Policies
The Parque do Coc6 fits into Ceari's environmental policy framework in two
ways. First, SDU agencies created the park at the same time as they made other
investments to improve the river's water quality. Second, once the officials had
created the park, they found the experience informed future environmental
initiatives.
Although public pressure and attention focused on protecting the green
area in the city center, the state had to improve the river's water quality, because
the value of creating an ecological reserve would have been undermined if the
river flowing through it remained contaminated. Three principal sites upstream
of the park polluted the River Coco: the shanty towns of Aerolandia and
Chapter 2
Conjunto Tancredo Neves, the industrial park in Maracanadi, and the
uncontrolled landfill site in Jangurusd' (see maps 2 and 3). Agencies from the
state department of urban development and the environment (SDU)15 tackled all
three at the same time as they began planning to protect the mangroves. They
reduced pollution from thefavelas by upgrading the areas and installing sewage
treatment plants, as described in Chapter 4. In Aerolandia, on the north bank of
the river, SEDURB installed anaerobic treatment plants, which discharge only
treated effluent into the river. Waste from Tancredo Neves and Conjunto Tasso
Jereissati flows into a stabilization lagoon.
To treat the industrial effluent, the state water company, CAGECE, built a
large but technically simple treatment plant, that came into operation in March
1992. The plant consists of five large settlement tanks, and collects sewage from
nine residential areas as well as the industrial park. The state government paid
58% of the US$ 4.5 million cost. The National Bank of Social and Economic
Development paid the remainder (Didrio do Nordeste 25 March 1992).
The landfill site pollutes the river when rainwater percolates through the
waste and forms leachate high in organic materials and containing some heavy
metals (Leitio 1992). This leachate then flows into the river. SEDURB, together
with the municipal waste agency, decided to build a new, controlled landfill site
away from the center of town. This new site, located in the nearby municipality
of Caucaia, came into operation in late 1992. As waste remains on the original
site, it will continue to pollute the river Coc6, but the new landfill site will ensure
that no new waste is added to the old polluting site. SEDURB spent
US$ 2 million project.16
15 4 agencies fall under SDU: the state urban development agency, SEDURB; the state environment
agency, SEMACE; the state popular housing company (COHAB), and the state water and sewage
company, CAGECE.
16 By 1991 SEDURB had spent US$ 1.4 million on the landfill site and estimated that it would spend
a further US$ 690,000 to complete it (AUMEF 1991). The figures indicate that installing the park
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In addition to fitting within these simultaneous initiatives, the Coc6 park
affected subsequent environmental policies. Once the authorities had created the
park, they found that the experience affected environmental projects in three
ways. First, the success of the experience showed politicians and officials in
Ceard that conservation is possible and popular. The state environmental
agency, SEMACE, which has taken over responsibility for park planning from
SEDURB, is now planning several other parks throughout the state. It has
created a 31.5 ha park around the Lag6a de Maraponga close to Fortaleza and
another around the Lag6a de Fazenda in Sobral, and is planning a second park in
Fortaleza, this time to protect the Rio Ceard, the city's other river. SEMACE is
also working with the federal environmental agency, IBAMA, to establish a large
protected area integrated with rural development in Jericoacoara, north of
Fortaleza.
Second, activists learned from the Coc6 experience. Environmentalists
now see the importance of working with low-income communities to advance
their own causes. Since the early days of the Coc6 campaign, in the late 1970s,
they have made determined efforts to help the poor voice their complaints about
pollution and environmental degradation. For instance, SOCEMA members
fought a polluting tannery, Santo Ant6nio da Floresta, in the early 1980s by
working with the poor communities whose drinking water was affected. As the
head of the Green Party in Ceara said, "The Coc6 fight taught us that we couldn't
just stand in the middle of the road waving flags. We have to involve local
people at the same time as we interact with those in power." Community leaders
also learned from the Coc6 experience. Now, two years after SEDURB built the
cost twice the cost of the landfill. This seems highly unlikely, given that it does not include land
expropriation.
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park, community leaders routinely use environmental arguments when they
press their claims. Those former squatter communities close to the Coc6 park use
their location to strengthen their arguments for more services from the city or
state. For example, one community leader from Lagamar, a large shanty town
just outside the park on a canal that drains directly into the river, told a state
housing official that his community should receive priority for housing
improvements and sewerage repairs because it was situated on the edge of an
environmental protection area and therefore threatening it.
Third, the project is contributing to environmental education in Fortaleza.
School trips come to see the mangrove from boats on the river, and a visitor
center describes the ecosystem. The park is a also the subject of publicity videos
frequently shown on television, describing the state's environmental initiatives.
This chapter, in summary, shows that years of pressure from
environmental activists combined with a set of specific opportunities to create
the need to establish the Parque do Coc6, which itself was part of a broader set of
environmental investments. Bringing different interests to support the project
turned out to be more important than factors such as integrated environmental
planning, often cited as prerequisites for success. Once the project was
completed, its success then made politicians, civil servants and the public look
more favorably on conservation projects than they had before, and helped the
cause of conservation in other parts of Ceard. Many of the opportunities that
stimulated the politicians to create the park were tied to the area's location. In
the following chapter, I discuss how creating a ecological reserve was easier in an
urban area than it would have been in a rural area.
CHAPTER 3
URBAN VS. RURAL CONSERVATION
An urban ecological park may sound incongruous, because those ecosystems that
still exist in urban areas do not usually merit preservation on purely ecological
grounds. Ceari has many larger mangrove swamps than those along the River
Coc6, with greater species variety, and in far more pristine conditions. The Coc6
mangroves make up only 1.4% of the 27,000 ha total area of mangrove in the state
(SEMACE 1992). Why did Ceari's most influential NGO not campaign to save a
larger, rural mangrove? Equally perplexing, why did the state make its first
investment in conservation to protect an area that was in no way its most
biologically valuable?
An outsider might expect decision-makers with the objective of protecting
mangrove swamps to have planned to locate a park in the area that protected the
most ecosystem at the least cost. In reality, however, rather than starting with a
blank slate, policy-makers design projects that fit within the existing frameworks
of interest groups, opportunities and policies (see Chapter 5). Except for very
simple projects, decision-makers do not operate according to pre-determined or
"scientific" models, but rather choose between policies that are only
incrementally different from what already exists, and that are relatively easy to
implement (Lindblom 1959 and 1979, March and Olsen 1976). In the Coco case,
these came together only in this urban location.
This chapter discusses how the urban location helped both politicians,
officials and activists create the park, and how it made possible deals to
expropriate land from two of the five landowners at no cost.
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3.1 The Urban Advantage
Why did the state create an ecological reserve in the middle of a city? Much of
the Coc6 vegetation has been cut and has re-grown, and many non-endemic
species have invaded the area (Rocha et al. 1987), and both factors reduce the
area's biological importance. Even after the water treatment investments, the
river is far from clean (Leitio 1992). Ceara's only environmental NGO,
SOCEMA, fought its largest and most successful campaign to save part of the
Coc6 mangroves. When I first began to research this case, I found it difficult to
understand why environmentalists had not allowed urban development to
destroy the Coc6 mangrove, fought for a smaller leisure park for the city and
then turned their attentions to some of the state's large pristine mangroves. I
now think that would have been the wrong strategy, for two reasons.
First, the Coc6 mangroves play an important ecological role, because they
prevent erosion and protect fish stocks. In many parts of Brazil, both the rural
and the urban poor live partly from subsistence. Although no precise data are
available, many of the city's two million inhabitants supplement their diets
and/or their income with fish and shellfish from the river Coc6. This gives an
added incentive for protecting the area, because if the river is polluted and the
mangrove destroyed, the poor no longer have that supplement. The Coc6
mangroves were the most threatened in the state, and therefore required the
most urgent action.
Second, the urban location brought advantages both to the
environmentalists and to the state. The visibility of the area to everyone in the
city helped SOCEMA call attention to potential threats to the area. High
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population densities (of rich and poor communities) around the area meant that
the park would potentially affect many people. As one SOCEMA activist said,
"The River Coc6 flows through a large area of the city. When it gets polluted,
that smell reaches a large number of people." This made it easier for SOCEMA
to mobilize the community. The area's high visibility also made it popular with
politicians. The governor wanted both his own electorate and a national and
international audience to know of his administration's good environmental
record. By locating a highly visible environmental initiative in the center of the
city, the governor could ensure that almost everyone driving through the city
would see the lush vegetation, and the signs linking the Parque Ecol6gico do
Coc6 to the Jereissati administration. Only those people specifically interested in
conservation would know about a rural park, however large, but any visitor
would see this urban initiative.
It is tempting to think that the Coc6 park was merely a token way for the
state to gain some environmental publicity. Protecting a small area of mangrove
in the city center could, after all, absolve the state from any responsibility to
protect other areas. In retrospect, however, the Parque do Coc6 has served the
cause of conservation in Ceard surprisingly well. The park has had an impact on
subsequent initiatives and is part of the state's environmental education
program, as described in Chapter 2.
In summary, locating the state's first conservation project in an urban,
rather than rural, area was key to the project's feasibility. Environmentalists
found it easier to mobilize people in the center of the city. The state government
found greater political payoffs creating a park in an urban area. Far from being
merely a token concession to environmental activists, this project has helped
conservation throughout the state.
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3.2 Innovative Deals
One of the major costs for agencies that want to create protected areas is that of
compensating landowners for the land. Park planners can lose much time
negotiating with powerful landowners, and often never reach agreement. Urban
land is usually more expensive than rural land, so one would expect city parks to
involve particularly troublesome land negotiations. The state managed,
however, to expropriate the land for the Parque do Coc6 relatively easily,
because SEDURB could strike deals with the four private landowners. Three of
these deals were only possible because the land in question was valuable (or in
one case visible) urban real estate.
Once the team of ecologists had decided upon the borders of the area to be
protected, SEDURB lawyers set about reaching agreements with the five
landowners. CAGECE, the state water and sewage company, owned part of the
land and did not require compensation for giving up its rights. Of the four
private landowners, one was Grupo Jereissati, the company that had built the
shopping center on 20 ha of mangrove in 1980. Tasso Jereissati, the company's
owner, had now been elected state governor and was one of the main proponents
of the park project. He donated the land to the state because he wanted the park
to succeed, and because he could not be seen to benefit personally from the
project.17 The other major private landowners were the construction company
Waldir Diogos (34 ha) the estate of Ant6nio Diogos (73 ha), and Joio Gentil, all
influential and powerful people in the state. Gentil owned the largest single
holding, 220 ha, nearly half of the park's 446 ha total. 18
17 The size of the plots donated by Jereissati and CAGECE was not available.
18 Raimundo Ferreira Sales and his wife also owned a 1 ha plot that SEDURB expropriated by
normal means.
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SEDURB lawyers worked out a deal with the two Diogos, taking
advantage of the restrictions already imposed on use of that land. State water
laws of 1977 and the municipal decree concerning the river Coc6 protected all
land on the margins of the River Coc6 less than 3 meters above sea level.
Landowners had to get permission from SEDURB for any deforestation or other
development. Creating the park would restrict the owners' rights to the land still
further, because they would have to give up all of their access and commercial
rights. A large part of the private land lay within the boundaries of the proposed
park. But approximately 5% of the Waldir Diogos and Antonio Diogos plots lay
outside the park boundaries and outside the area protected under the water laws.
The owners had rights to commercialize this land in theory, but felt it was highly
unlikely that SEDURB would grant permission. To create the park, SEDURB
struck a deal with the landowners, whereby the agency granted them permission
to build on the land outside the protected area in return for the owners donating
the rest of the plot to the park. Under this agreement, the Waldir Diogos
company and the estate of AntOnio Diogos would be left with a small area in the
most desirable residential area of town on which they were guaranteed
permission to build an apartment building or office block directly adjacent to a
large, permanently protected open space. Both landowners gladly agreed to the
deal.
SEDURB could not work out a similar deal with the third private
landowner, Joio Gentil, who owned the largest area, because all 220 ha of his
plot lay within the area of the proposed park. Expropriation restricted his use of
the land, so Gentil opposed the park, and announced that he would fight against
it. SEDURB officials say that state water laws meant that Gentil had no rights to
use the land below the 3 m mark, but Gentil disputes this. It seemed that
SEDURB would have no choice but to expropriate the land, against Gentil's will,
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and compensate him at market value, an expensive proposition that could have
made the park prohibitively expensive. It turned out, however, that SEDURB
could work out another deal, because Gentil owed a large debt to the state.19
Few details of these negotiations are available, but it seems that the governor
offered to forgive some or all of Gentil's debt in exchange for compensation for
expropriating the land. On this basis, SEDURB went ahead and expropriated the
land, but Gentil has subsequently disputed the sum he is to receive in
compensation, and has taken the matter to court. To date no money has changed
hands, and the case is still in court. The highly public nature of the Coc6 case
has, however, weakened Gentil's opposition to the deal. As he put it, "Now,
when I object to the governor expropriating my land, the press paints me as an
enemy of nature."
The Parque do Coc6 implies, therefore, that conservation planners'
assumptions that land expropriation imposes excessive costs on governments is
not always correct. As in many other public and private sector projects, the
ability to strike innovative deals is crucial to success (Frieden & Sagalyn 1989,
Eccles 1988, Tendler 1991). In this case, the state, motivated by an interest in
creating the park, managed to strike deals with two of the landowners and
overcome opposition and push down the price of expropriation with the third.
Given particular land characteristics, a conducive legislative framework and
creative deal-makers, acquiring land for conservation through purchase or
expropriation can be well within the financial reach even of poor areas in
developing countries.
This chapter therefore explains how the urban situation helped make the
Parque do Coc6 possible. The activists found it easier to mobilize people because
19 This information comes from an interview with former governor, Tasso Jereissati.
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a greater number of people would have suffered if the mangroves had been
destroyed. The state wanted to create an urban park because the location
increased the number of people who would see and benefit from the park. In an
urban area, they were also able to strike deals with two of the landowners that
depended on high land values. The urban location resulted in protection of a less
than perfect ecosystem, but it is at least protected. Because it is small and
biologically-impaired, this is probably not the park that some mythical "rational
planner" would have designed in order to maximize conservation in Ceard, but it
was the park that was easiest for officials and politicians to accomplish. By
creating this park, the state "picked the low-hanging fruit", and now have an
area successfully protected. The project's contingency on specific local
circumstances described in the previous chapter can seem to leave no role for
outside intervention, but its very dependence on contingency gave flexibility for
the government to act opportunistically. The state was able to respond to specific
pressures and take advantage of opportunities to establish the project.
One of the reasons for the project's success is its integration of
conservation with the housing needs of local low-income communities. The next
chapter describes Ceard's shanty town upgrading policies, and how the project
managed to reconcile conservation and shanty towns.

CHAPTER 4
HOUSING THE HOMELESS
The Parque Ecol6gico do Coc6 integrates conservation with housing and services
for the low-income communities of Aerolandia, Conjunto Tasso Jereissati and
Conjunto Tancredo Neves.20 In this chapter, I show the forces behind the state's
investment in low-income housing and behind SEDURB linking housing with
conservation. I begin by discussing low-income communities' campaigns for
shelter, which forced low-income housing high on the governor's priority list. I
then discuss how the plans for the park stimulated SEDURB to upgrade the
favelas on the edge of the park before other priority sites. Next, I discuss how the
park planners had no choice but to include shanty town upgrading in the
conservation project, and how this integration led to alliances between
conservationists and community activists. This project was one of the state's first
experiences with self-help housing, and the third section of this chapter describes
the lessons from these early experiences that inform current upgrading practice.
4.1 Campaigning For Shelter
At the same time as the environmentalists were campaigning to persuade the
authorities to create the park, another totally unrelated campaign was heating
up. This campaign centered around providing shelter and services for the city's
20 Aerolindia grew up in 1987 when 2,000 families invaded state-owned land on the north banks of
the Lag6a do Coc6. Conjunto Tancredo Neves, on the south banks of the lake, consists of some
800 squatter families and some 4,000 houses from a 1983 housing project. Conjunto Tasso
Jereissati did not exist before this initiative and was created to house people relocated from the
nearbyfavela of Lagamar
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growing squatter community, and the pressure they created was vital in causing
the park planners to integrate shanty town upgrading with the park project.
Since the end of the 1940s, the lack of adequate housing has been a
persistent and acute problem in many cities in Brazil. As in many other
developing countries, shanty towns have mushroomed in major cities, where
people are crammed into inadequate housing without water or sanitation.
Water-borne diseases bring grave health risks (Beckerman 1992), and, as cities
become more crowded and people concentrate on ever more unsuitable land,
squatters face additional problems. Living on steeply sloping land makes
communities vulnerable to landslides; houses within flood plains of rivers or
lakes make residents vulnerable to flooding; living on urban waste tips further
increases the likelihood of disease (Kreimer and Munasinghe 1992).
In response to these difficult conditions, low-income communities in
Brazil and throughout Latin America began to form neighborhood associations
in the 1950s to press federal, state and municipal governments for low-income
housing. In Fortaleza, for example 30,000 people joined in a march demanding
low-income housing in 1962 (Braga and Barreira 1991:61). The military
government in Brazil suppressed these movements, but they sprang up again in
the 1980s, as the country moved towards democratic rule. Neighborhood
associations pressurized government agencies to provide services to their
community (Annis 1988, Cardoso 1989, Ferguson 1992, Gilbert and Ward
1985:206, Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987, Jacobi 1990, Watson 1992). Politicians
also often encourage these organizations to form, as they give opportunities for
political patronage by providing services to the community in return for votes
(Collier 1976, Braga and Barreira 1991).
The first mayor elected in Fortaleza since the military coup helped low-
income communities mobilize for housing. Maria Luiza Fontenele, from the
Campaigning for Shelter
Workers' Party (PT), gave high priority to helping low-income groups to
mobilize for their rights. In 1987, nine years after SOCEMA's eco-picnic, she
supported representatives from 123favelas who occupied land outside the
governor's palace for eight days, demanding land rights and housing in full view
of anyone visiting top officials, including staff from the Federal Government and
international donor agencies. Demonstrations of this type forced the problems of
squatter settlements onto the state government agenda.
As the neighborhood associations became better at making their voices
heard, the state government's position towards these communities began to
change. Tasso Jereissati, elected governor in 1986, could not ignore them, and
probably did not want to, because these groups formed a large electoral base.
From the start of his term of office he encouraged community groups to form and
emphasized increased public participation in projects (Braga and Barreira
1991:68). In contrast to all previous practice in Ceard, where politicians had
tended to respond to individual requests in return for votes, the new
administration insisted on demands made by an association representing a group
of individuals. 21 The groups' concerns centered on shelter, and the state
government gave a high priority to meeting their needs. By 1988, moreover, the
federal government had devolved more power to the states, which gave Cear6"
more flexibility to conduct housing policies independently of the CEF. Past
policies that relocated squatters to housing projects on the edge of the city failed
for reasons I explain in section 4.3. The governor therefore mandated that the
new programs should leave squatters on or close to the site of their original
settlements wherever possible.
SDU officials therefore began to prioritize existing shanty towns for
upgrading. They looked for the largestfavelas where people were living in the
21 This fits with similar findings in Mexico (Fox 1992).
Chapter 4
most precarious conditions. To keep costs down, they gave priority to
settlements on state-owned land. One of their seven priority sites lay on the
banks of the River Coco. They owned land there because Virgflio Taivora's
administration had expropriated vacant land on the banks of the Coco in 1980
and had dredged the river as a flood prevention measure, forming the Lag6a do
Coco. By 1982, the state had built 4,000 low-income houses and created the site,
called Conjunto Tancredo Neves. The dredgers had dumped the waste material
on state-owned land on the other side of the lake. During the 1980s squatters
gradually moved in and built shanties on land around the Tancredo Neves
housing project, and in 1987, 2,000 families invaded the land on the other side of
the lake. The community that grew up on top of the lake spoil is now known as
Aerolandia. The state government therefore already owned the land on both
sides of the lake, making it prime site for upgrading. The following section will
explain how the SEDURB park planners linked the shanty town upgrading
project with the Parque do Coc6.
4.2 Integration of Conservation and Favela Upgrading
Much of the unusual nature of the Coco park lies in the integration of
conservation with the housing needs of three low-income communities.
SEDURB park planners, however, did not intend to integrate the park with
shanty town upgrading, any more than SEDURB and COHAB housing officials
intended to link their first experience with self-help housing to an ecological
park. The governor, with SEDURB and COHAB developed the two policies
separately and the particular characteristics of the land around the River Coco
then forced officials to integrate the two sets of policies. The state would have
intervened to improve the shanty towns on the edge of the park at some stage,
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but the park plans stimulated SDU agencies to act earlier than they otherwise
would have.
The park planners could not create the park without dealing with the
shanty towns, as some 10,000 residents all discharged their waste directly into
the river. Two of thefavelas, Aerolandia and Tancredo Neves, had grown up on
land that would ordinarily lie inside the protected area's boundaries. Clearly,
from an environmental perspective, it would have been less than optimal to have
people living within the boundaries of a protected area; all the more so when the
people are crowded in unstable housing, without water, solid waste or sanitation
services and constantly adding waste to the river the planners were trying to
clean up.
At first, the park planning team which SEDURB coordinated felt it had
two options. They could either remove these shanty towns, perhaps re-housing
the residents in another area, or they could draw the park boundaries so that the
shanties did not fall within the preservation area. After SOS Coc6's public
protests, the governor had mandated SEDURB's land use department to create a
park on the edge of the river. After the city's low-income communities mobilized
for housing and services in situ, he had separately mandated another SEDURB
department (along with COHAB and other agencies involved in popular
housing) to upgradefavelas close to their original sites. If it was to fulfill both of
these mandates, SEDURB had no choice but to provide the squatters around the
Lag6a do Coco with housing and water, waste and sewage services on the sites
they already occupied.
The SEDURB park planning team therefore decided not to re-draw the
boundaries, but only on condition that their agency's other department (along
with COHAB) would upgrade the three shanty towns that were discharging
waste into the Coc6. The land in Conjunto Tasso Jereissati and most of
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Aerolandia lay outside the 100 year flood line, so it was not vulnerable to
flooding and SEDURB could upgrade these settlements in situ. The Tancredo
Neves community on the south bank of the Lag^a do Coc6 lay within that line
and many houses flooded each time it rained heavily. SDU provided land for
this community to construct houses nearby in Barroso.
The park project therefore provided the impetus for the SEDURB housing
department to select the areas on the banks of the Lag6a de Coc6 for this early
mutirdo project, rather than one of their other priority areas. Once SEDURB had
combined these two projects, they found that the two sets of activists
independently pressing the state for housing and conservation were both in
favor of the initiative. Their separate and previously conflicting campaigns
became mutually supportive.
The low-income groups involved in this story fall into two categories. The
first group, subsistence fishermen, stood to benefit from environmentalists'
campaigns and consistently joined in the conservation protests. The second
group, neighborhood associations fighting for housing and services, typically
either have no links with environmental struggles or even conflict with them. As
one resident of a Fortaleza shanty-town said, "We are living in paper and plastic
houses that flood every time it rains. The governor should spend money on that,
rather than beautifying the city with parks." Indeed, the SOS Coc6 campaign
had dashed with one of the squatter's organizations in the late 1980s. SEDURB
had proposed filling in a small area of the River Coc6 to build some 40 houses to
shelter families from a nearby area. Some of the environmental activists opposed
this, on the grounds that any cutting of mangrove and landfilling of the area was
wrong, whatever the purposes, and that these people could be housed in another
nearby area. In the end, the environmentalists lost the fight, and SEDURB built
the houses. This argument (perhaps unfairly) lost the environmental movement
Inadvertent Integration
much credit in the eyes of both the authorities and the shanty town residents,
who both felt that the environmentalists were somehow anti-poor.
Once SEDURB had planned to upgrade the favelas as they created the
Coc6 park, however, any pressure for one part of the project automatically
helped the cause of the other. The environmentalists did not help the
neighborhood associations receive services as a means of forcing the authorities
to clean up the river, but an accidental complimentarity of the two groups' aims
caused each working in its own self-interest to cooperate with the other.
This case shows the power of policies that elicit the support of apparently
conflicting interests. Alliances between groups might be easier to form than
either participants or observers may expect. In the Coc6 case, separate policies
came together and led to the park integrating conservation and shanty town
upgrading. This was serendipitous, yet it need not have been. Politicians or
officials could deliberately look for policies that overlap the several interests and
turn rivals into allies as well as establish better projects.
4.3 Lessons From Self-Help Housing Programs
SDU upgraded thefavelas on the margins of the Parque do Coc6 using self-help
housing, a technique known in Brazil as mutirdo housing.22 This involves
legalizing squatters' land claims then providing building materials and technical
support. The communities build their own houses, either on vacant plots or on
the sites of their former residences (Rakodi 1990, Ospina 1985, Ward 1982). It is
several times cheaper than constructing completed housing units. 23 Self-help
housing is often plagued by organizational problems, but housing officials in
22 The term mutirao (plural mutirdes) can be applied to many projects with a reciprocal arrangement
where a group of people work together for individuals from the group.
23 The precise cost difference varies from project to project. In Ceard officials estimate that a mutirdo
house costs the state 10-15% of the cost of providing a completed house built to federal standards.
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Ceara say that their program is unusually successful, and is recognized as such
throughout Brazil. The Coc6 sites were among the state's first full-scale
experience with this form of upgrading. Shortly after the state began the Coc6
project, and before they completed it, they began several other mutirdo projects.
Together, these early initiatives provided officials with experience and lessons
for subsequent projects. In this section, I describe first why SDU chose self-help
housing, and then discuss the lessons from the early experiences.
Low-income housing policies in Brazil have changed substantially over
the last decade. Until the mid 1980s, federal, state and municipal agencies in
Ceara and elsewhere in Brazil typically reacted to illegal settlements by evicting
squatters, bulldozing the shanties, and relocating the squatters to public housing
projects (Perlman 1980, Braga and Barreira 1991). Under the military
government, public housing policy had provided families with ready-made
houses with low-interest mortgages financed by the Housing Finance System
(SFH), guaranteed by the National Housing Bank (BNH). State Housing
Companies (COHABs) designed and built uniform houses to standard models,
which the poorest sectors of society could seldom afford. Indeed, of the 4.5
million houses constructed under the SFH between 1965 and 1984, only 723,000
(16%) were aimed at low-income families (defined as those earning less than 3
minimum salaries) (Braga and Barreira 1991:79). Even when low-income families
could afford the housing, they could often not afford to live there. The
authorities located the housing projects on or beyond the edge of the city, in
areas ill-serviced by urban infrastructure such as transport, health centers and
schools (Perlman 1980). Commuting from these areas to jobs in the city center,
for example, involved bus journeys of up to two hours each way and paying bus
fares that could amount to more than 10% of a minimum salary. As a result,
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large proportions of the "beneficiaries" abandoned the houses and returned to
shanties in the city center. 24
The democratically elected Sarney government brought in new policies.
In 1986, it abolished BNH and passed most of its functions to the state-owned
Federal Savings Bank (CEF). In 1987 CEF set strict borrowing ceilings for the
state housing companies and established the Special Secretariat for Housing and
Social Programs (SEHAC) to run a national program of self-help housing
(Programa Nacional de Mutirdes Habitacionais). Between 1987 and mid 1988, states
across Brazil planned to build a total of 550,000 housing units, but completion
rates were "very low" (Melo 1992:41). Cear& completed some 54% of the 4,121
houses planned under this program, although the state used its own funds to
complete some of these houses after the SEHAC program ended (Braga and
Barreira 1991).25
When the state government of Ceard decided to embark upon a shanty
town upgrading program, it chose self-help housing, even though early
experiences with the Federal program had been bad. Poor community
organization rather than technical difficulties caused most implementation
problems, such as community leaders stealing materials, communities never
completing the project, or recipients selling their houses and returning to live in
shanties. SDU decided that the cost advantages outweighed the risks of poor
implementation. In 1989, therefore, SEDURB and COHAB26 officials began a
program to build some 1,400 houses on the edge of the Coc6 park in Aerolandia
24 Several studies in Rio de Janeiro indicate typical default rates between 75% and 85% (Perlman
1980:270).
25 1 do not have precise figures on implementation.
26 In shanty town upgrading projects, SEDURB is responsible for planning the sites and installing
services such as street paving and drainage. COHAB is responsible for housing standards and
technical support for the communities building their houses. The water and sewage company,
CAGECE provides technical support for installing water and sewage works. The Department of
Labor and Social Programs organizes the cadastres.
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and Conjunto Tasso Jereissati. Both of these projects succeeded. In less than two
years, the communities completed 575 houses on the north bank of the Lag6a do
Coc6 and 838 on the south bank, and installed water and sewage services for
both communities. Many of the state's early projects were not so successful.
Lessons from these early experiences have helped mutirdo policies in Cear6
evolve since the early days. The agencies and communities involved in the first
few areas to be upgraded found several ways the program's organization could
be improved, and implemented these changes. Some of these differences come
from the Coco experiences and others from subsequent or simultaneous projects,
and I was not able to isolate the lessons the agencies drew directly from
Aerolandia and Conjunto Tasso Jereissati and from those they drew from other
cases. The changes fall into two categories: (i) the role of the mutirdo coordinator,
(ii) individuals' labor contributions.
(i) The coordinator is key to the success or failure of a mutirdo project. He
or she faces a major task, involving ordering building materials from suppliers,
organizing teams to guard the stores, setting timetables for each family to start
and complete their house and ensuring that the family keeps to the schedule,
amongst other things. The coordinator must ensure that everyone understands
how to build the house and that each house follows COHAB's plans. Perhaps
most importantly, he or she has to keep track of the project's finances. At first,
the elected community leader took charge of the housing projects, even if he or
she was not receiving a house. The community leader's principal function was to
present the neighborhood's interests to the authorities. He or she did not
necessarily even live in the community, but simply lobbied for its interests with
the state and municipal authorities.
Elected community leaders often had problems organizing housing
projects, because the two roles conflicted. Whereas the community leader acted
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for the residents in return for their support, the housing organizer was asking
residents to contribute labor, and also had responsibility for handling the
community's jointly owned funds. People in some neighborhoods resented the
leader for asking them to work, they suspected him or her of using joint money
for personal reasons, and sometimes turned their allegiance to another leader.27
The community leaders also resented the extra burden, as one leader from
Lagamar said, "We leaders had to take care of constructing houses, which is not
our job. Our job as leaders is to get the governor to answer our claims." (cited in
Braga and Barreira 1991:243, my translation).
Housing officials attribute many organizational problems (such as
running over budget, disappearance of building materials, falling behind
deadlines and failing to complete projects) to ineffective leadership. In three
cases shortly after the Coc6 experience, SDU officials attributed problems either
to the community leader's corruption, or to the leader not commanding the
community's respect. These problems did not occur in Aerolandia because of the
power of its community leader. The authorities, however, cannot count on
similar leadership in all communities.
In an attempt to reduce these problems, COHAB in Ceard changed its
policies. Now the person responsible for building the houses must be different
from the elected community leader. The mutirdo coordinator heads up an
organization called the Community Society for Popular Housing (SCHP). He or
she must be receiving a house in that stage of the project, to increase the
coordinator's incentives to complete the project. To reduce problems of
community leaders skimming off funds and materials, COHAB has reformed the
payment system. In the first projects, Aerolandia and elsewhere, the community
27 Peattie (1990) found similar outcomes in a self-help housing project in Peru.
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leader and the treasurer of the community organization controlled the funds.
SDU transferred the money in one payment directly to the community bank
account. Under the new policy, it transfers the money in three installments (40%,
40% and 20%), and all checks to building contractors must be signed by the
Community Society's president and treasurer, and the COHAB engineer
responsible for the site.
The leaders of mutirdo projects, however, still operate under perverse
incentives. They must work full time for the one to two months it takes to
construct the houses. When the state constructs ready-made houses, COHAB
officials coordinate the project, yet leaders of mutirdo projects are unpaid.
Almost only unemployed people, therefore, can do the job. It is little wonder,
then, that the coordinators sometimes steal building materials.
(ii) Family labor contributions for self-built housing projects can take
many different forms. In the first mutirdo projects in Ceard, each family in the
community had to contribute a fixed amount of labor to the project in order to
receive a house. The community built all the houses at once over the course of a
few months. When they were complete, the community leader conducted a
lottery to decide which family would receive which house. This meant that
people building the houses had no idea where they would eventually be living,
nor whose house they were building, and therefore that people had an incentive
to become free riders. If they worked hard and built a sturdy house, they would
probably not reap the benefits, as they might be allocated to a less well-built
house somewhere else. People therefore often worked fewer hours than their
obligation. Some families would send elderly people or children to do their
share of the labor. Now, the communities organize the lottery as soon as the
housing officer has marked up the plots for the new houses, so they know from
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the beginning which house will be theirs. Each family is responsible for
constructing its house, and making arrangements for mutual help as they choose.
This new system alleviates a second labor problem. The adults in around
half the families of a typical project work during the day and employ a bricklayer
to make their labor contribution. In the early projects, these families had to pay
the bricklayer to work for the same amount of time that an unskilled resident had
to contribute, even though a professional works much more efficiently than the
untrained, inexperienced householders. Two bricklayers, for example, told me
they built a house in four days, whereas a couple building their own, identical
house next door said they expected it to take them around one month. This
situation imposed unfair costs on the families that worked during the day. Now,
they know from the start which is to be their house and only have to pay the
bricklayer for the time it takes actually to build the house.
Although self-help housing projects in Ceard have been successful on the
whole, the Coc6 case also illustrates that agencies cannot apply the same policy
in every situation. The history of different areas plays a vital role. Conjunto
Tancredo Neves lies across the Lag6a do Coc6 from the successful mutirdo project
in Aerolandia. Here, however, SEDURB only began the housing project in 1992.
The 806 squatter families built their houses in nearby Barroso, because the
original site was vulnerable to flooding. Not only did the program start later in
Tancredo Neves, but this community also experienced more problems
organizing the housing construction than did Aerolandia and Conjunto Tasso
Jereissati.
Officials attribute both the delay and the construction problems to lack of
community organization. Why, though, was this community less able to
organize itself than Aerolandia on the other side of the Lake? Part of the reason
lies in the different ways these communities invaded the land; indeed, experience
Chapter 4
in other squatter settlements confirms that settlement patterns often influence
squatters' abilities to organize (Gilbert & Ward 1985, Drakakis-Smith 1990). In
Aerolandia, on the north bank of the Lag6a do Coc6, all the community members
together invaded the land in 1987. As soon as the people had erected their
shelters, they formed a neighborhood association and began a fierce campaign to
receive housing and services from the state government. The community chose
to lobby the state rather than municipal government because the state owned the
land. The community leader, Dona Raimundinha, had been involved with an
earlier upgrading project in nearby Lagamar, and had cultivated alliances with
the head of the Secretariat for Urban Development (SDU), and openly affiliated
herself with the governor's political party. This community leader was strong,
some say authoritarian, but respected by the community. This organization
allowed the community to build its 575 houses quickly and keep to the planned
timetable.
Although Aerolandia was highly unified, Tancredo Neves was a
fragmented community. The area had been the location of a state housing
project (not self-help) in 1983.28 The original residents had sold their houses, to
the extent that by 1990, some 60% of the families who had received houses in the
1983 project had moved out. Many of the new residents were from the middle
classes. During the 1980s, new squatters invaded the area around the houses,
little by little. Each new family constructed its shelter closer and closer to the
water's edge, until many homes were being flooded several times a year. When
the authorities came to decide which families would be the first to receive
housing in the mutirdo, they picked the newcomers first as they lived in the most
28 The original housing project was itself problematic. The state constructed some 4,000 houses to
house residents of a nearbyfavela , and the area was originally called 0 Novo Lagamar. After
long delays in handing the houses over to the new residents, the squatters "invaded" their own
housing project. This is described in Braga and Barreira 1991.
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precarious conditions. The middle class residents of Tancredo Neves felt no
allegiance to the landless squatters, and resented them for turning their
neighborhood into afavela. Among the squatters, the early arrivals resented the
newcomers for usurping their claims to mutirdo housing. This lack of cohesion
amongst the squatters explains, therefore, why this community had more
problems constructing its houses and representing itself to the authorities.
To sum up, Ceard began a program of self-help housing, taking up the
initiative of a defunct federal project. In the course of its early experiences
around the Parque do Coc6 and elsewhere in the city, the authorities improved
their implementation practices. The settlements on the two sides of the River
Coc6, however, gave different results largely because of the way the squatters
had originally settled them.
4.4 Conclusion
Once planners of the Parque do Coc6 integrated conservation with low-income
housing, the park's chances of success increased dramatically, because
previously conflicting policies and interests now overlapped and were mutually
supportive. This integration, however, did not require leaders and civil servants
dedicated to integrating conservation with the needs of the poor, or converted to
the cause of sustainable development. Some of the key actors in this project may
have been extraordinary people, but successful execution of this plan did not
require them to be. Officials did not decide in advance to integrate environment
and development, but this goal it emerged during project. Project goals often
develop in this way, after or during projects (March 1972, March and Olsen
1976). Two separate policies, for shanty town upgrading, and to protect an
ecologically important area had long parallel histories of struggle that came
together at one particular time. Though environmental objectives drove the
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initiative, the congruence of policies created the imperatives for the agency to
reconcile conservation with the needs of low-income communities.
Once they had done that, the agencies in Cear& found themselves in their
first full-scale shanty town upgrading project. They took the experience from
these and other early projects and have developed a set of management
techniques that make them among the best managers of mutirdo housing projects
in the country.
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ORGANIZING THE ADMINISTRATION
Part of the success of the Parque do Coco is due to the administration of the
project. Many apparently good projects fail because agencies cannot implement
them effectively (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Implementation even of
simple projects involves a complex and convoluted web of interdependencies.
The state of Ceara managed to implement the Parque do Coc6 and, furthermore,
took it from planners' drawing boards to completion in little over one year. This
chapter analyses the administrative factors that facilitated rapid implementation.
First, I discuss the administrative structure of the project, with one, non-
environmental, agency coordinating and implementing the project. In the second
section, I discuss how the administration was easier because the plans were
consistent with previous projects in the same agency. In the last section, I discuss
two aspects of the project that reduced the overall administrative burden.
5.1 A Single Agency
The fewer agencies involved in a project, the easier it is to implement, because
agencies have different agendas that they bring to bear on the project. When
these agendas conflict, the relative power positions of the agencies involved tend
to determine project outcomes (Grindle 1980, Tendler 1991, Pressman and
Wildavsky 1973). Agencies' individual incentives can also hinder cooperation.
For example, an environmental agency might want to create the largest park
possible, whereas a housing agency might want to upgrade the largest squatter
settlement in the city. Neither agency individually would in that case have
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proposed creating the Coc6 park and upgrading the shantytowns on the
margins. Moreover, when an agency coordinates a project involving officials
from several agencies, it runs the risk of being ignored as the team members
pursue their interests, irrespective of the wishes of the coordinator (Chisolm
1989).
In the Coc6 case, the state urban development agency, SEDURB,
coordinated a multi-agency team. A marine biologist from the Federal
University (although not from SOCEMA) led a team that consisted of three
architects and a geographer from SEDURB, an architect from the municipal
planning agency, and two environmental specialists from the environmental
agency, SEMACE. How did SEDURB ensure that the agencies all worked
together? First, as SEDURB is responsible for land use planning and urban
infrastructure projects in the metropolitan region of Fortaleza, it is an
implementing as well as a coordinating agency. 29 Agencies that implement
projects usually have more money, power and prestige than those that only
coordinate (Tendler 1991). Second, and probably because it has implementing
capability, it is the most powerful agency of those involved in the park project.
The agency also had good political connections, as its former head was now in
charge of SDU. SEDURB could therefore use its power to overcome any inter-
agency difficulties that arose.
The decision to locate the Coco project in the urban planning agency was
key to the project's success, but it too was contingent on particular local
circumstances rather than deliberate design. Ceara had an environmental
29 The state created the agency as AUMEF in 1974, to coordinate urban planning issues in the
metropolitan region of Fortaleza. Its role expanded to include some project implementation in
1987, and the Coc6 park was one of the first projects it implemented. The agency's
responsibilities expanded to cover urban areas throughout the state in 1991, when it became
SEDURB. Its focal areas are urban infrastructure, such as sanitation, water resources and land
use, repairing roads, paving public squares etc.
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agency, SEMACE, at the time of the project, which should have been the
institutional home of the park project. Indeed, SEMACE is now responsible for
planning conservation initiatives. The park project began in 1988, only a year
after the governor had created SEMACE. At that time the agency was still
finding its feet, and could not take on a major coordination task. SEMACE was
glad to let SEDURB take control of the project.
This choice of SEDURB over SEMACE not only aided implementation of
the park itself, but also helped integrate the project with low-income housing.
Earlier chapters describe the two independent movements that pressurized the
state for this project: SOS Coc6 campaigned for the protection of the mangroves
and the neighborhood associations campaigned for housing and services.
Because the environmental agency usually runs conservation projects and the
housing agency usually deals with shanty town upgrading, environmentalists
typically target the environmental agency andfavela residents concentrate their
efforts on the housing agency. Neither agency has an incentive to integrate their
projects. Also, because agencies have unequal powers within governments, the
separate campaigns depend on the relative strength of the agencies they address.
In the Coc6 case, however, both campaigns targeted the same agency,
because the same agency had responsibility for both parts of the project.
Different departments within SEDURB handled the two parts of the project, and
they did not formally communicate. Both groups of campaigners pressed their
claims through the governor and directly on the agency. Neighborhood
associations from Aerolandia and Tancredo Neves were bringing their petitions
for housing and services to SEDURB at the time as SOCEMA was pressing them
to protect the Coc6 mangroves. Community leaders would sit waiting to speak
to SEDURB housing officers outside the offices where the SEDURB park team
was deciding whether to include the shanty towns in the park. Political
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pressures to resolve both aspects of the case therefore fell on the two or three
senior officials at SEDURB. When they then realized that the success of the
project as a whole depended upon creating the park and upgrading the
shantytowns in situ, they decided to integrate the two aspects of the project. The
land use department and the housing departments continued to work
independently on their parts of the project, they did not form a Coc6 project
team, but the project then proceeded as if it were an integrated whole.
Developments since the Coc6 experience indicate that the government of
the state of Ceard might lose the advantage it inadvertently designed for itself.
SEMACE, the environmental agency, is now better established, and has taken
over responsibility for planning all future parks, both urban and rural. As
SEDURB still decides which shantytowns to upgrade, one agency is no longer
responsible for the two types of decisions and bringing the two types of projects
together may become more difficult.
In summary, when the governor decided to create the park, the state's
environmental agency, which would normally have been responsible for the
project was not ready to take on the task. This circumstance meant that the state
land use agency took on the project. This was fortuitous for two reasons. First,
because SEDURB was a more powerful agency than SEMACE, it was better able
to implement the project. Second, because the park was now administered in the
same agency that planned sites for shanty town upgrading, top officials could see
the advantages of integrating the two projects.
5.2 A New Project Consistent With Old Plans
The Coc6 project was complex. It involved bringing together environmentalists
and neighborhood associations who had been involved in long, independent,
and sometimes conflicting struggles. SEDURB had to negotiate the land
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expropriation, design the park, construct the infrastructure and upgrade the
shanty towns. To take advantage of the political circumstances outlined in the
previous chapters, the state had to complete the park quickly. Moreover,
SEDURB had no experience of conservation. How could the planning agency of
a state government in the poorest region of a developing country overcome
difficulties that so often confound agencies throughout the world? How could
they establish this park in the space of little more than a year?
Part of the reason lies in the park project's fit with one of the agency's old
projects. Policies generally are easier to implement if they fit with agencies'
existing knowledge and understanding (Weiss and Cohen 1992). Also, an agency
can only take advantage of sudden opportunities, such as those described in
Chapter 2, if it is prepared to do so (March and Olsen 1976). The Coc6 park fit
with knowledge and understanding officials gained through a long range plan
developed in the late 1970s. This is surprising because current planning
literature seldom has positive words to say about long range plans, that were so
fashionable in the 1950s. Most authors conclude that plans serve principally to
gather dust on bureaucrats' shelves, as they are impossible to implement (Caiden
and Wildavsky 1971). This literature tends to deal with multi-sectoral plans,
where one program or document aims to coordinate the actions of several state
agencies. The agencies that make the long range plans are also often not those
that have to implement them. They tend therefore to be impracticable and their
objectives may even conflict with those of implementing agencies (Pressman and
Wildavsky 1973).
In contrast, SEDURB's long range plan dealt with a single sector, water
resources, and SEDURB implemented the plan itself. SEDURB drew it up in
response to the 1965 Federal Forestry Code, which created 30 m protected strips
of land on the banks of all rivers and lakes in order to protect the country's water
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resources. The Code excepted urban areas, because they could not leave such
large areas undeveloped. Brazil has nine classified urban and metropolitan
areas, of which Fortaleza is one.
Under the provisions of the code, they each had to develop drainage plans
and pass implementing legislation in order to establish narrower protection
strips along water courses. Ceari's metropolitan agency, SEDURB, prepared a
map of all the lakes and rivers in the metropolitan region and created the State
Drainage Plan, published in 1976. This plan served as the basis for the state
water laws, which the legislature passed in 1977.30 These establish a 15 m
protected strip on the borders of the principal water resources in the
metropolitan region, or individually specified strips for particular water courses.
The strip for the Coc6 river protected all land on the banks less than three meters
below sea level.
SEDURB designed the plan only to protect water resources, and did not
take biological criteria into account. For example, the original protection zone
may easily cut through an ecologically valuable area of mangrove, leaving half of
it protected and the area lying outside the protected strip available for
development. Even those areas that the law protected suffered destruction. Lax
enforcement meant that landowners, developers and squatters routinely ignored
these laws and built apartments, established industries, set up shanty towns, or
dumped waste on protected land. Land speculation, which caused most
destruction, was most intense in the areas on valuable land, including along the
banks of the River Coco.
More than a decade after it published the Drainage Plan, the governor put
SEDURB in charge of planning the Coc6 park. Some of the plan's original
30 Law 10.1477 of 1 December, 1977 concerning land use for protection of hydrological resources in
the Metropolitan Region of Fortaleza and Law 10.148 of 2 December, 1977 concerning the
preservation and control of hydrological resources in the Ceard.
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authors still work in SEDURB, and the agency's civil engineers use the plan
regularly. Most officials find the study valuable; some refer to it as their Bible.
These officials saw the park as an opportunity to ensure enforcement of the state
water laws, at least for one river. Although the Parque do Coc6 is designed to
protect biological as well as water resources, its borders expand on the original
protected strip established under the water laws. The engineers and hydrologists
therefore saw it as a natural extension of the earlier plan, the latest stage in an on-
going project the agency had been carrying out for fifteen years.
This fit with the Drainage Plan contributed to the park's success in two
ways. First, the park inspired enthusiasm among the SEDURB park planners,
making them more inclined to implement the new project, as it allowed them to
add to the implementation of an old project that they liked, and they knew many
of the technical issues involved. Second, the previous plan allowed them to act
upon the park plans quickly, as they had completed background studies, taken
aerial photographs and gathered other data more than a decade before.
In summary, members of the Jereissati administration often portray the
Parque do Coc6 as a bold new initiative to conserve the state's precious natural
resources. In fact, it was an extension of a general plan that had been simmering
on the back burner for more than ten years. SEDURB did work quickly, but
could only do so because the Coc6 project had a long administrative gestation,
just as it had a long history of public protest. The park project in 1989 dovetailed
within an overall plan for the region's water resources that SEDURB had written
in the late 1970s. SEDURB officials thus viewed the Coc6 project positively, and
had much of the technical information they needed to define the boundaries of
the new protected area, helping them overcome the difficulties of implementing
this complex project.
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5.3 Reduced Administrative Burdens
The best projects are those that reduce the amount of effort for the implementing
agency, both in creating the project and in maintaining it (Ostrom 1992). Two
aspects of the Coc6 project's design caused local communities, working in their
own self-interest, to help the agencies involved implement and maintain the
project.
First, self-help housing reduces the implementation burden on public
officials. When communities build their own houses with materials and
technical assistance from the state, community leaders take on a coordination
task that would otherwise fall to an official from the housing agency. This
enables COHAB officials to become involved in upgrading a larger number of
houses. Self-help only reduces burdens, however, when the shanty town
organizes this construction effectively. A badly organized community, such as
Conjunto Tancredo Neves, can make the housing agency's job harder.
Second, the local communities help the state monitor the park.
Monitoring is a key problem for environmental projects (McNeely 1988, Wells
and Brandon 1992). By now, most developing countries have established
environmental agencies and have a comprehensive set of laws and regulations
for environmental protection, but they generally lack either the will, political
power, finance, and/or the institutional capability to implement or enforce these
laws and regulations (WDR 1992, Moreil and Poznanski 1985:144-154). As the
head of Ceara's environmental agency, SEMACE, put it: "Our environmental
protection laws here in Ceara are among the best in the country, but no-one
complies. Even if we had the infrastructure, we couldn't put an inspector beside
every waste water pipe, nor an eco-policeman beside every tree." The principal
threat to the Coc6 mangroves comes from squatters invading the land and setting
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up settlements, both destroying vegetation and discharging waste into the river.
The residents of the upgraded shantytowns, Aerolandia and Conjunto Tasso
Jereissati, no longer consider their neighborhood afavela, and want to avoid
connotations with shantytowns. They therefore repel any invaders that try to
construct shanties nearby, and thus reduce (although obviously do not remove)
the need for park monitoring.
In summary, this chapter describes the institutional aspects that led to the
success of the Coc6 case. First, administrative burdens did not stifle the project,
as they do so many others, because it fell to the relatively powerful urban
planning agency rather than the weaker environmental agency. SEDURB was
able to push the project through and overcome any inter-agency conflicts. This
agency was coordinating plans for shanty town upgrading, which helped
integrate the park with housing low-income communities. Second, the project fit
well into a major study of water resources that SEDURB had carried out more
than a decade before. Officials therefore agreed with the park project's aims and
worked more enthusiastically on the park. They also had the technical
information and background data they needed to plan the park quickly. Third,
two aspects of the park's design reduced administrative burden. Self-help
housing programs have community members performing the coordination that
would otherwise fall to the housing agency official. The communities that the
state upgraded as part of the project then help to monitor and enforce the
mangrove protection, by repelling any squatters that try to invade land near to
their new houses. The administrative design of this project arose fortuitously,
because the environmental agency was not ready to take on the park. Future
projects could, however, incorporate the lessons from this fortuity.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Many aspects of the success of the Parque do Coc6 were contingent on a
combination of local circumstances and past events particular to Fortaleza at that
time. This appears to limit the potential for intervention, since these
circumstances can neither be predicted nor reproduced. On the contrary,
however, policy makers could deliberately incorporate into future projects many
of the successful aspects that arose fortuitously in this case. This project that
successfully integrated conservation with low-income housing reveals the
following lessons:
First, the project worked, despite not meeting some of the preconditions
for success documented in the literature. Literature on integrating conservation
with the needs of local people says, amongst other things, that projects should be
planned from the start as an integrated whole, and that local people and/or
officials should be educated about the importance of conservation. The Coc6
project worked because politicians and officials wanted it to, even though
integration withfavela upgrading was ad hoc and only the environmentalists had
any formal environmental education. In contrast, the park is now a key part of
the state's environmental education program.
Second, what appeared to be a compromise initiative, turned out to be the
best option. The park was an opportunistic response by the governor to a
combination of political and structural factors. Investing in despoiled rather than
pristine mangrove was more politically attractive and easier to implement.
Decision-makers did not act according to some master plan, but took advantage
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of circumstances to adopt the plan that was possible. Although perhaps less than
perfect ecologically, this park exists, and the state is enforcing its protection.
There are many valuable ecosystems all over the world that are of international
biological significance but that are not protected. Activists have long lists of
campaigns for areas to be protected, struggles that have either failed or that have
not come to fruition even after years of campaigning. Even amongst those parks
that have been created in developing areas, the great majority are threatened by
illegal uses and encroachment. These problems are often the result of complex
phenomena involving marginalization of poor communities, forcing them to
exploit natural resources beyond sustainable yields. Conservation in the form of
protected areas seldom addresses these root causes, yet it does offer some
protection to the land. As such it can be seen as a robust band-aid solution. The
Parque do Coco was better than a band aid, however, because it protects the
mangrove, and stimulated measures to rehabilitate the very groups on the park's
perimeter that often threaten conservation attempts in other areas.
Third, apparent constraints can become advantages. Much of the success
of this project is the result of serendipitous circumstances, but it need not have
been. In the Coc6 case, the park planners were boxed in: they could not ignore
the squatters, because the untreated sewage from 10,000 people polluted the
river, whilst state policies prevented them from moving the squatters to another
area. They therefore had to choose that area to upgrade, and install sewage
systems. Officials could look for, or create, situations that have similarly
constrained conditions, where different actors have no choice but to combine
their interests into one project.
Fourth, conservation brought other benefits. Environmentalists often
think of conservation as an end in itself. In the case described here, a
conservation initiative had spill-over effects in other parts of the city. The state
Conclusions
created the park as part of an initiative to clean up the River Coc6 that involved
building a waste water treatment plant and new landfill site to remove pollution
sources upstream of the park. The state upgraded the shanty towns that were
polluting the park. These successful projects encouraged COHAB and SEDURB
at the beginning of the city-wide upgrading program.
Fifth, administration was easier because the land use agency, rather than
the environmental agency, coordinated the project. The land use agency
implements infrastructure projects in the municipal area and is more powerful
than the environmental agency. The project's fit with the agency's past work
helped officials implement the park plans quickly.
In conclusion, the Parque do Coc6 is a small area of mangrove swamp. Its
principal interest does not come from its fauna and flora. It stands in the center
of Brazil's fifth largest city as an example of the possible benefits of conservation
to the whole city. It has contributed to teaching a part of the city's population
and its civil servants about the benefits of flexible and strategic planning, as well
as the advantages of nature conservation. Because it managed to reconcile
conservation with the housing and sanitation needs of local communities, this
project is one small, but rare, example of success.
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ANNEX 1
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Chronology
1969 The municipal government tried to expropriate a 20 ha site on the banks of
the river Coco and create Fortaleza's first leisure park. Lack of funds for the
expropriation made this impossible and the plans were shelved.
1974 Autarquia da Regiio Metropolitana de Fortaleza (AUMEF) is formed to
coordinate all land use planning in Fortaleza and the surrounding
municipalities. One of their first tasks is to carry out a drainage plan for the
metropolitan region. AUMEF therefore starts mapping out and defining the
water resources.
1976 A Professor of Physics at the Federal University of Ceard starts the Cear&
Society for Environmental Protection, composed of other academics, students
and some professionals (architects and engineers). The first campaigns are to
stop the use of pesticides on Fortaleza roadsides and to protect the coconut
palms along the beach front.
As part of the planned drainage plan, state laws 10.147 and 10.148 are
passed which establish a 15 meter protection zone on the margins of all water
resources.
1977 AUMEF completes mapping the region's hydrological resources and
publishes the drainage plan, which defines protection areas on the borders of all
rivers in the metropolitan area. This plan is designed to protect water resources,
the protection zones, therefore, are based on hydrological rather than biological
criteria.
The Bank of the Northeast of Brazil (BNB) begins to negotiate with the city
government to buy an area on the banks of the River Coc6 on which to build its
headquarters. SOCEMA views this as a threat to one of the last remaining pieces
of mangrove in the city center and campaigns to stop the construction and
protect the land by converting it into a leisure park.
1978 SOCEMA's campaign to stop the BNB's construction on the banks of the
Coc6 culminates in an ecological picnic attended by over 2,000 people. Eleven
days later, the president of the BNB writes to the city hall abandoning their plans.
The municipal government expropriates the land and converts it into the leisure
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park the campaigners had demanded, the 46 hectare Parque Adail Barreto, now
part of the larger Parque do Coc6.
1980 The banks of the River Coc6 flood constantly, causing problems for the
people living in illegal settlements on its banks. In an attempt to resolve this
problem, AUMEF dredges the river, a process that creates the Coco Lake (Lagba
de Coc6). The land on the borders of the lake is owned by private landowners,
one of whom still owns large tracts of land in the current Park. AUMEF
expropriates this land and uses the land on the north shore to deposit the
dredged material. The state begins a federally-funded housing project on the
south shore, where many of the residents of the original shanty towns move.
This project, Conjunto Tancredo Neves, subsequently expands as more illegal
invaders move in around the housing project.
1982 Opening of Iguatemif, a shopping center on the banks of the River Coc6,
the construction of which involving cutting down 23 ha of mangrove. This area
directly abuts what are now the limits of the park. The developer of this site is
Tasso Jereissati, who will become governor of the state in 1986. SOCEMA and
others had organized a small but vocal protest against this development. The
campaigners refer to this as the only real fight they have lost.
1985 Brazil returns to civilian rule. The political liberalization that
accompanied this change allowed many civil movements to develop, including
SOS Coco, formed by representatives of a broad group of organizations with
environmental interests in Ceard to fight for a program to clean up the river and
protect the mangroves on its banks.
1986 Fortaleza elects a mayor from the Workers' Party (PT) in the first
democratic mayoral elections since 1964. Maria Luiza Fontenele has a program
which encourages the poor and disadvantaged groups to organize themselves.
She organizes, encourages and takes part in demonstrations demanding, inter
alia, low cost housing and services from the state government.
The municipal agency with responsibility for planning and the
environment, SPLAM, designates the area beneath the high water line for the
whole of the Rio Coc6 as an environmental protection zone. The reasons for this
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seem to be largely political in nature, as the move makes no substantive change
to land use.
At this point all low income housing projects are planned and funded at
the federal level, and implemented by the state branch of the federal agency
(COHAB). No state money funds shanty town upgrading. The functions of the
Federal Agency responsible until now for developing and implementing national
policies on low income housing transfer to the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa
Econ6mica Federal). As part of the financial reforms at a federal level under
President Sarney, CEF restricts federal funds for housing projects.
1987 The state's first democratically elected governor since 1964 takes office.
Tasso Ribeiro Jereissati is a young, urban businessman and founder of the
Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB).
Some 2,000 squatter families invade the land that had previously been
expropriated on the north bank of the Lag6a de Coc6. The families construct
shacks on top of the dredged material and call the area Aerolindia.
The Federal Government sets up the Special Secretariat for Housing and
Community Action (SEHAC) to try to relieve some of the stress caused by
blocking funds to all states with internal debt. This agency begins a national
initiative for self built housing, as part of which state government of Ceard was to
build some 4,000 houses.
1988 AUMEF coordinates a team, led by a professor from the Federal
University of Ceard (UFC), to define the area the state should designate as a park.
This study stresses the biological and ecological aspects of the area, whereas the
previous study had defined the protection zones merely in terms of how they
would protect the water resources.
The Federal Government disbands SEHAC, and COHAB abandons the
plans for self-built houses. The State Urban Development Secretariat (SDU)
decides to continue with the plan, this time using state funds. The first sites
chosen for this initiative are both banks of the Lag a do Coc6, on the land
already expropriated by the state.
Two state decrees define the areas along the banks of the Coc6 river
designated for top category environmental protection and declare part of this are
the Parque Ecol6gico do Coc6.
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Fortaleza elects Ciro Ferreira Gomes as mayor. He is from the same party
as the governor (PSDB).
1989 The state of Cear& elects Ciro Gomes as governor to take over from Tasso
Jereissati.
1991 The community on the north bank of the Lag6a do Coc6, Aerolandia,
complete constructing 1,200 self -built houses with water and sewage services.
400 of these are on the south bank, adjacent to Conjunto Tancredo Neves (built
in 1980) in an area that will be known as Conjunto Tasso Jereissati.
Building from this initial experience, SDU expands the self-built shanty
town upgrading program to other areas of the state. Over five years the state
moves from getting around 1,000 houses constructed per year, to over 6,000.
1992 AUMEF (now called SEDURB) starts self-built housing project in Barroso,
close to the Lag6a do Coc6 to take the residents of Tancredo Neves, the shanty on
the south bank of the Lag6a do Coc6. These families cannot stay on the sites of
their original homes, as they are within the flood area.
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews
Public Agencies
Superintendency for Urban Development and the Environment (SDU).
Interviews with Dr. Marconi, Roberto Craveiro and Dra. Elena, engineers
responsible for low-income housing programs. 4 August 1992.
Secretariat for Urban Development (SEDURB). Total of ten interviews including:
* Airton Ibiapina Montenegro Jr., the head of the agency. 27 July 1992.
* Marta de Matos Brito Gradvohl, Director of the Department of Technical
Information. 15 June 1992
* Francisco Mendes Giffoni, assistant to agency head. 7 August 1992.
e Dr Rui, engineer responsible for drainage systems in low-income
communities. 15 June 1992.
* Dr Fernando, director for the land use division. 7 August 1992.
Secretariat for the Environment (SEMACE). Total of nine interviews including:
* Eduardo de Aradjo Soares, head of SEMACE. 14 July 1992.
* Regina de Aradjo Soares, Technical Director. 16 June and August 1992
* Paulo de Castro Miranda, director of the Division for Protection of Natural
Resources. 17 July and 22 July, 1992.
* Dr Williams, department of water quality. 17 July 1992.
* Jos4 Cristomo, department of technical assistant to municipalities. 10
August 1992
e Dra. Lucia, administrator of the state environment council. 25 August
1992.
State Housing Company (COHAB). 4 interviews including:
* Mires Marinho Bouty, department for special settlements. 14 August
1992.
e Marco Antonio de Menenses, head of construction. 19 and 25 August
1992.
* Dra Virginia, research department. 25 August 1992.
State Water and Sewage Company (CAGECE). 7 interviews including:
* Carlos Augusto Moreira, Assistant to the head of operations. 30 July 1992.
e Renato Rollin, technical operations. 3 August 1992.
* Luciano Freire Maia, sanitation department of the central laboratory. 19
August
Superintendency for Labor and Social Programs. 5 interviews including:
e Adolfo de Marinho Pontes, former head of SEDURB, then head of the
Secretariat for Urban Development and the Environment, currently head
of the Superintendency. 8 July 1992
e Ruth Torres Hollanda, Architect. Former SDU employee. 24 July and 3
August 1992.
e Ediny Lemos, capital city division. 3 August 1992
Municipal Agencies. 5 interviews including:
* Tomaz Lima de Carvalho Rocha, President of the Municipal Waste
Company, EMLURB. 10 July 1992
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* Pedro Secundo Maia Rocha, Director of Operations at EMLURB. 14 July
1992.
* Helder Bonfim, head of SPLAN, municipal environmental agency. 16
August 1992
2 Key Individuals
Aida Maria Eskinazi de Oliveira, marine biologist from the Federal University of
Ceard's laboratory, Labomar, head of the technical team to delimit the park
boundaries. 12 August 1991.
Maria Luiza Fontenele, Federal Deputy and former mayor of Fortaleza. 20
August 1992.
Joio Gentil, owner of 220 ha of land expropriated to create the park. 3 August
1992.
Ciro Gomes, Governor of the state of Ceara. 27 July and 24 August 1992
Nilson Holanda, former President of the Banco do Nordeste do Brasil. 21 July
1992.
Tasso Ribeiro Jereissati, former Governor of Ceari, 6 August, 1992.
3 Low Income Communities
Dona Raimundinha, community leader of Aerolandia. 24 June 1992
Dona Raimunda Chaves, president of the residents' association of Lagamar. 26
June 1992.
Visits to Conjunto Tancredo Neves, Conjunto Tasso Jereissati, Barroso, Lingua de
Cobra, Vila Velha.
4 Environmentalists
Joio Alfredo, lawyer, former State Deputy and head of the state legislative
assembly's environmental committee. Member of the State Environment Council
and environmental activist. 24 August 1992.
Marilha Brandio, Professor of Biology, Federal University of Ceari (UFC), one of
the founder members of SOCEMA, and member of the State Environment
Council. 30 July 1992.
Vanda de Claudino Sales, Professor of Geography of the Federal University of
Ceard. Member of SOS Coc6 and State Environment Council. 8 July 1992
Joio Saraiva, head of the Ceari branch of the Green Party. 22 July 1992.
Fldvio Torres de Aradjo, Professor of Physics, UFC and founder of SOCEMA. 13
August 1992.
